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THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF RACIAL
PROFILING IN TRAFFIC STOPS AND
SEARCHES: RETHINKING THE
USE OF STATISTICS TO PROVE
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
Abstract: This Note summarizes and synthesizes developments in statisti-
cal analyses of racial profiling data and the legal response to the use of
such methods in civil rights cases. Researchers have developed new
strategies specifically designed to measure statistical associations between
a driver's race and the frequency of vehicle stops and searches. Courts' re-
sponses to the use of the statistical evidence derived from these methods
are varied. This Note argues that modern developments in data collection
and statistical methodology to detect racial profiling support a legal rule
that strong statistical associations in well-developed studies should consti-
tuteprima facie evidence sufficient to prove discriminatory intent.
INTRODUCTION
"Racial profiling" has become a pervasive practice in recent
times, beginning with the War on Drugs and gaining new followers in
the War on Terror.' To date, the term "racial profiling" has been used
to encompass a wide array of topics, such as jury selection, enrollment
at institutions of higher learning, disparities in the quality of public
education, and searches conducted on passengers at airport termi-
I See A. Allen-Bell, The Birth of the Crime: Driving While Black (DWB), 25 S.U. L. REV. 195,
202-03 (1997). The modern day War on Drugs was declared in 1973, when President Rich-
ard Nixon established the Drug Enforcement Administration, pledging to reduce drug-
related crime. Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973
Establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration, 1 Pus, PAPERS 228 (Mar. 28, 1973), The
War on Terror began when President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Con-
gress and the entire nation on September 20, 2001, stating, "Our war on terror begins with
Al Qaeda, but it does not end there." Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1140,
1141 (Sept. 20, 2001). The effects of racial profiling on airport travel are the most fre-
quently cited example of this new rise in racial profiling. See Melissa C. Bancroft, Congress
Urged to Ban Government Agencies from Racial Profiling, JURIST, Jan. 28, 2007, http://ju-
ristlawpitt.edu/ paperchase/2007/ 01 / congress-urged-to-ban-government php; see also End
Racial Profiling Act of 2004, S. 2132, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (11) (2004).
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nals.2
 Racial profiling in traffic stops has resulted in "the proportion
of African Americans among the drivers searched by police far ex-
ceeding] the proportion in the general population of drivers." 3
In the 1990s, allegations of racial profiling drew political discourse,
but congressional efforts to combat racial profiling gradually faded from
the media spotlight in the wake of September 11th and the com-
mencement of the War on Terror.4 As one scholar has noted, "it appears
that the events of September 11th have derailed Congress's motivation
to pass federal legislation banning racial profiling." 6 Nevertheless, racial
profiling concerns have reemerged in the press, both with respect to a
new type of profiling in the War on Terror and new findings on profil-
ing in an older, on-going struggle—the War on Drugs. 6
In April of 2005, the Bureau of Justice Statistics released results
from a survey of 80,000 people which indicated that minority drivers
were three times more likely to have their vehicles searched following
traffic stops than white drivers. 7 The political fallout and subsequent
2 See Steven R. Wolfson, Racial Profiling in Texas Departments of Public Safety Traffic Stops:
Race Aware or Race Benign?, 8 SCHOLAR 117, 124-29 (2006). For the purposes of this Note,
racial profiling is defined as the practice of conducting traffic stops and subsequent police
actions in part due to the officer's reliance on the vehicle occupant's race. See id. Various
definitions for racial profiling have been given. Id. For example, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union refers to racial profiling as "the discriminatory practice by law enforcement
officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual's race, eth-
nicity, religion or national origin." See American Civil Liberties Union, Racial Profiling:
Definition (Nov. 23, 2005), www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/21741res20051123.
html. The U.S. Department ofJustice defines racial profiling as "any police-initiated action
that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior of an individ-
ual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified
as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity." See DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A
RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS 3 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffileslibja/184768.pdf.
3 See Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131; see also John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehi-
cle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 .J. POL. EcoN. 203, 204 (2001).
4 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. Cm. LEGAL F.
163, 163-64.
. 5
 Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African Americans in the Selective En-
forcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REv. 721, 730 (2004).
6 See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge Between the War on Drugs
and the War on Terrorism, 67 U. Pirr L. REV. 756, 757-58 (2006) (arguing that the emphasis
on law enforcement led to a decline in civil liberties that first began as a slow and thus
largely unnoticed result of the War on Drugs, and has been greatly exacerbated by the War
on Terror); Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt
by Association Critique, 101 Mimi. L. REV. 1408, 1411-12 (2003) (discussing the debate be-
tween national security and civil liberties perspectives regarding the effects of the War on
Terror on U.S. citizens).
7 See Dan Eggen, Official in Racial Profiling Study Demoted, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at
A7.
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demotion of the Chief of the Bureau of Justice Statistics overshadowed
other possible implications of this emerging body of statistical litera-
ture—namely; what role these statistics should play, if any, in civil rights
claims brought by alleged victims of racial profiling during traffic stops. 8
Public policy concerns demonstrate that civil litigation is a neces-
sary tool in the battle to combat discrimination on the nation's road-
ways.8 The hurdle, however, of proving discriminatory intent, as re-
quired to succeed in racial profiling claims, has been nearly insur-
mountable."' Statistical evidence can serve as a powerful tool to estab-
lish intent and overcome this preliminary burden."
Part I of this Note reviews the traditional approaches statisticians
use to detect associations between race and traffic stops/searches by
law enforcement officers." It also examines the common obstacles
statisticians face when analyzing racial profiling data." In particular,
this Part considers: (1) the populations and data used to compare mi-
nority with non-minority drivers stopped; (2) how large a statistical
disparity must be to be considered a "strong" association; and (3) the
common weaknesses and concerns, from the statistician's perspective,
with analyzing racial profiling data." Part II discusses modern data
collection initiatives and recent improvements in statistical method-
ologies that are designed, in part, to address the difficulties that arise
when attempting to draw statistical inferences from racial profiling
data." Part III reviews the spectrum of common law approaches to
the use of statistics to demonstrate discriminatory intent in racial pro-
filing claims." Part IV argues that improvements in the ability of sta-
tistics to detect racial profiling warrant the adoption of a rule that evi-
dence of strong statistical associations between driver's race and
subsequent vehicle stops/searches may be used as prima facie evi-
dence of discriminatory intent in racial profiling claims.'?
See Eric Lichtblau, Profiling Report Leads to a Demotion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at
Al.
9 See infra notes 244-260 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 136-147 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 84-126 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 18-83 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 18-83 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 18-83 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 84-126 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 127-170 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 171-260 and accompanying text.'
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I. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR THE STATISTICS OF INTENT:
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF
RACIAL PROFILING DATA
A. Statistics to Estimate Disparities in Vehicle Stop/Search Rates
Any statistical study of racial profiling must address: (1) whether
racial profiling is related to the frequency of traffic stops and search-
es; (2) how strong of a relationship between the racial profiling and
stops/searches exists; and (3) whether the observed measure of dis-
parity in treatment by law enforcement can be explained by some fac-
tor other than racial profiling. 19
To demonstrate a statistical showing of racial profiling, one must
show that the disparity in the risk of being stopped by law enforce-
ment is not only higher for a racial minority group, but also that the
disparity cannot be explained by some other nondiscriminatory factor
or chance variations in selecting whom to stop. 19 In general, all esti-
mates of racial profiling involve comparisons of two populations:
those who belong to a minority group believed to be targeted due to
racial profiling, and those similarly situated drivers who differ, at least
theoretically, only with respect to race." These populations are com-
pared by calculating a statistic of interest to measure the disparity in
traffic stops and searches. 21 Researchers have proposed using such
measures of disparity as differences in proportions of traffic rule vio-
lators stopped, ratios of the relative risk of being stopped for minority
versus nontargeted groups, regression correlation coefficients meas-
uring the association between race and traffic stops and searches, and
odds ratios that compare the odds of minority drivers being stopped
to the odds of non targeted drivers being stopped. 22
15 See Julia Lamber et al., The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A 7)pology, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 553, 583 (1983). For the purposes of this Section, analogies have been
drawn to the analysis of employment discrimination and jury selection statistical analyses,
which have been extensively gathered and published. See generally D. Baldus & J. Gale, STA-
TISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 153 (1980). The premises, however, of all these analy-
ses are the same: one compares the proportion of those affected with the baseline of all
persons who could be affected by the decision to stop vehicles by law enforcement officers.
See id.
IP See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Journalists and Academics and the Delivery of Race Statistics: Being
a Statistician Means Never Having to Say You're Certain, 4 RACE & SOC'Y 149, 157 (2001).
20 See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 209, at 799 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
21 See Lamber et al., supra note 18, at 590.
" Id. at 591. It is important to note that for the purposes of detecting racial profiling,
we must examine whether minority group members are stopped disproportionately when
compared with other racial groups, even though they are driving in a similar manner, with
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Next, researchers examine the strength of the observed associa-
tion." Researchers typically determine variability of the estimate—i.e.,
how precise the measure is. 24 They then look at whether the plausible
range of estimates supported by the data falls outside the bounds of
what one would expect if the likelihood of being stopped or searched
were equal among racial groups.25 In addition, they calculate the prob-
ability of observing a disparity as large as, or even larger than the one
actually observed if there were no racial profiling and the differences
were due to chance. 26 This is known as the p-value, and the smaller the
p-value, the more likely the observed disparity in stops/searches be-
tween minority and non targeted groups was clue to something other
than chance.27 Stated in another way, researchers compare the ob-
served stop/search rate with that which would be expected if there
were no racial profiling. 29 "Statistically significant" results help elimi-
nate the alternative explanation that the observed relationship between
race and traffic stops or searches is due simply to chance. 29 Results
achieve a pre-set level of statistical significance if the likelihood of
achieving a result/statistic more extreme than the one observed is less
than a certain cutoff, often set at five percent. 3°
Finally, researchers are left with the difficult task of examining
whether the observedrelationship was really the result of some other,
legitimate reason for the observed disparity. 5 ' If comparison popula-
similar vehicle equipment, at similar times of day and days of year, and within similar geo-
graphical locations. See id.
23 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 802.
24 Id.
25 Id.
Id.
27 See id.
28 See Lamber et al., supra note 18, at 579-80.
29 See David Barnes, Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation, 64 LAW &
CONTKMP. PROBS. 191, 210 (2001).
" See id. at 198-99. Statistical evidence can be suggestive of racial profiling even if it
fails to meet some arbitrary cutoff, such as five percent. See id. However, many courts reject
evidence that is not strong enough to achieve statistical significance because it appears that
experts are speaking outside their field, and advocating values that would otherwise not
prove conclusive in statistical literature. See id. at 199 n.6. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has ruled that in all racial discrimination cases, statistical disparities
observed or calculated must achieve a level of significance at least two standard deviations
greater than the level that would be expected in the absence of racial profiling. See generally
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d
1078 (4th Cir. 1982); D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant ?, 61 WASH. L. REv.
1333 (1986).
21 See Lamber et al., supra note 18, at 583, 590. If we were merely interested in dispa-
rate impact, we would compare the rates of being stopped/searched in a targeted group
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tions were truly identical with respect to all characteristics other than
race, then any difference would be due to racial profiling. 32 It is diffi-
cult, however, to obtain data regarding other crucial characteristics of
driving populations, such as who is on the roadway, who is violating
traffic laws, and what other possible discretionary factors police con-
sider when determining whether to stop and search a vehicle." For
this reason, one of the most typical concerns regarding racial profil-
ing estimates is the data from which they are derived."
The reliability of study results and the applicability of a study to
an individual's personal experience with law enforcement depend on
far more than just the statistical strength of the relationship between
race and stops/searches calculated for a particular study. 35 Statistical
significance is not the same as reliability_ of study results." There are
several sources of uncertainty involved in quantifying the relationship
between race and law enforcement stops and searches. 37 These all may
affect the ability to rely on results to infer discriminatory intent."
Some of these include the adequacy of the sample size to detect a re-
lationship, the reliability of the sample data collected, the need to
control/adjust for other factors that may actually explain an apparent
relationship, the difficulty in extrapolating results from the study
population to the driving population at large, and the difficulty in
extrapolating once again from the driving population at large to an
individual litigant."
B. Collecting Data to Compare Driving Populations:
Types of Data on Racial Profiling
For a given jurisdiction, three types of data must be collected in
order to determine whether minority groups are being subjected to
with the rates for the driving population at large. See id. In this scenario, an observed dis-
parate impact may clearly exist, but it could be due to any number of factors other than
racial profiling. For example, minority drivers may commit more traffic offenses or may
live and drive in locales more heavily policed for nondiscriminatory reasons. See id.
32 See id.
" See id.
54 See id.
33 See Barnes, supra note 29, at 196-208. Professor David Barnes asks, "[statistics] pur-
port[] to summarize how the positions of people like the plaintiff are affected by acts like
the defendant's but what turns that bare number into sufficiently convincing proof of cau-
sation?" See id. at 197.
" See id. at 208.
37 See id.
" See id.
" See id. at 198-99,
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racial profiling. 40 Traffic data is used to determine the race of all driv-
ers on the highway, violator data is used to determine the race of driv-
ers committing moving violations, and stop data is used to determine
the race of drivers stopped and subsequently searched. 41
First, traffic data includes the demographic makeup of all drivers
using roadways within a particular jurisdiction. 42 In an attempt to
demonstrate that minority motorists are being treated unequally, sta-
tistical data on the population of drivers is often offered to show that
minority drivers are stopped in numbers disproportionate to their
presence on the roadways." One method for estimating the demo-
graphics of the driving population is to use census data.44 Statisticians
and courts alike argue that census data is unreliable to estimate the
racial composition of the mobile, fluid driving population from which
a plaintiff was stopped because census statistics only account for the
resident population of the area. 45 In addition, one court has noted
that "kit is widely acknowledged that the Census fails to count every-
one, and that the undercount is greatest in certain subgroups of the
population, particularly Hispanics and African-Americans." 46 In addi-
40 See, e.g., RAND, ASSESSING RACIAL PROFILING MORE CREDIBLY (2004), http://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9070/RAND_RB9070.pdf;  Racial Profiling Data Collec-
tion Res. Ctr. at Ne. Univ., Reporting and Analysis of Benchmarks, http://wwwracialpro-
filinganalysis.neu.edu/reporting/benchmarks.php  (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter
Reporting and Analysis Benchmarks].
41 See Jack Riley & Greg Ridgeway, Measuring Racial Profiling by Police, LAW ENFORCE-
MENT NEWS, June 2004, available at http://www.rand.org/commentary/070604LEF.html.
42 Id.
45 See, e.g., Anderson v. Cornejo, 355 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 2004); Chavez v. DI. State
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2001); United Stites v. Avery, 137 F.Sd 343, 356 (6th
Cir. 1997); see also Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. State Police, 454 F.
Supp. 2d 339, 343 (D. Md. 2006); White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410-12 (D.N.j.
2002); United States v. Guzman, 894 F. Supp. 642, 646-47 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
44 See Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited Use and
Management of Race in Police Decision-Malting, 15 Geo. MASON U. CIV. Rrs. U. 219, 239
(2005).
45 See id. at 237, 240. In addition, the U.S. Department of justice has warned that using
a city's total population data to determine whether a disproportionate number of minority
drivers in the city are stopped is inherently unreliable because it assumes that members of
each racial group violate laws at the same rates and that police officers patrol areas where
the demographic mix of the city is the same as the driving population. See Joyce McMA-
HON ET AL., How m CORRECTLY COLLECT AND ANALYZE RACIAL PROFILING DATA: YOUR
REPUTATION DEPENDS ON ITI 1-3 (2002), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?
Item=770.
45 See Chavez, 251 F.Sd at 643. The court does go on to say that despite the obvious
flaws of the census data, states use it to conduct redistricting and allot votes, and the U.S,
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has cited it in past opinions; nevertheless, these
uses involve static populations of residents and are not meant to reflect the driving popula-
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tion, the number of minorities living in the United States has risen
sharply in recent years, making census data increasingly less reliable
over the course of its ten-year duration. 47
As a result, some plaintiffs use observational studies in an attempt
to establish "baseline" driving population demographics in the area in
which they were stopped.` These studies, however, may be difficult
for private parties to implement and may result in insufficient data
when determining the population of drivers in general and drivers
with the same violations as plaintiff in particular.49
The second type of data, violator data, is collected by determin-
ing the race of all drivers that commit moving vehicle violations." For
the most part, statistical evidence of all drivers who could have been
stopped by the police is not readily available because these drivers'
racial groups are not recorded in reports or documented in prosecu-
tion files, but rather these drivers are merely allowed to continue driv-
ing without interruption 5t Thus, plaintiffs are faced with the burden-
some task of financing their own observational studies to allege racial
profiling, which requires researchers to design and implement proto-
col to monitor traffic and record the race of violators.52
In the event that observational studies are used to collect violator
data, these datasets may also be incomplete because they lack data on
other potential factors that contribute to decisions to stop and search
vehicles." Police may take a wide variety of other factors into consid-
eration when stopping a vehicle, such as traffic patterns, the behavior
of drivers or passengers, and the characteristics of the vehicle itself,
thereby reducing the number of drivers "similarly situated" in terms
of traffic violations. 54 Although these types of observational data are
highly useful because they allow one to control for any disparate im-
tion. See id. at 643 (citing Bradley V. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995)).
47 See id. (noting that the 2000 Census estimated that the number of Hispanics living in
the U.S. increased by 57.9% since the prior Census of 1990).
48 See, e.g., RAND, supra note 40; Reporting and Analysis Benchmarks, supra note 40.
4° See, e.g., RAND, supra note 40; Reporting and Analysis Benchmarks, supra note 40.
For example, Professor Michael R. Smith notes numerous cases where observational stud-
ies had insufficient sample sizes in general, or did not include enough observations from
the area where plaintiff was actually stopped, in particular. See Smith, supra note 44, at 239-
41.
5° See Smith, supra note 44, at 241.
51 Id.
52 See id.
" See id.
" See id. at 237.
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pact due to unequal violation rates among different races, such data
are also among the most difficult to collect. 55
The last type of data, stop data, constitutes information on the
race of drivers stopped and the subsequent police action taken. 56 Stop
surveys generally refer to the citation and field reports completed by
officers in the line of duty. 57 Criticisms of police officer stop data on
drivers actually pulled over for alleged motor vehicle violations center
on both the quality and quantity of data collected. 58. In the past, law
enforcement agencies collected little, if any, information regarding
the race of motorists stopped for traffic violations." For example, in
Chavez v. Illinois, a 2001 case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, the Illinois State Police were accused of racial profiling
in traffic stops during the agency's operations as part of the War on
Drugs and had failed to keep comprehensive records for all motorists
stopped.° Between 1990 and 1994, the agency actually recorded less
than five percent of all the incidents that gave rise to a citation or in-
depth field report, and the majority of these forms did not list race. 61
The court concluded that the paucity of data remaining was unreli-
able because there was "no indication of the total number of stops ...
thus it is impossible to tell if this sample size is sufficiently large to be
reliable."62 In addition, the self-reporting, nonrandom nature of this
sample of stops by the very police officers accused of racial profiling
may lead to officer reporting biases and inaccuracies."
55 See Smith, supra note 44, at 237. The U.S. Department of Justice acknowledges that it
is ''virtually impossible" to determine the racial make-up of the total violator population of
an area. Set JOYCE MCMAHON ET AL., A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ANALYZING RACIAL PRO-
FILING: SAMPLE TEMPLATES FOR ANALYZING CAR-STOP, DATA 3 (2005), http://www.
cops.usdoj.gov/flles/ric/Publications/e03180002.pdf.
56 See Smith, supra note 44, at 239.
57 Id.
53 See id. For example, in Chavez, the Seventh Circuit concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence even to allege disparate impact, much less discriminatory intent, because of
the inadequacy of the available statistical data. 251 F.3d at 645-46.
59 See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 645-46. .
It See id. at 642.
61 See id.
See id. at 643.
65 See id.; see also Smith, supra note 44, at 237-38.
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C. Study Limitations and Uncertainty: Correlations Versus Cause and the
Diff iculty in Drawing Conclusions About Individual Litigants Using
Population-Level Profiling Data and Statistics
Demonstrating discriminatory intent in racial profiling cases
amounts to proving that law enforcement racial bias "caused" the driv-
ers' car to be stopped and searched. 64 It is difficult to draw an inference
that statistical studies demonstrate intent or "cause" in legal cases be-
cause causation in science and causation in law differ in two respects—
the purpose for examining events and the levels at which human be-
havior is examined. 65 Although these fields overlap when determining
what role, if any, racial profiling plays in traffic stops and subsequent
searches, the two fields have different uses for such information: pre-
diction, explanation, and attribution of responsibility to individual ac-
tors.66
In general, statisticians are interested in analyzing data and exam-
ining associations/causation to predict or explain events on a societal
level.67 Prediction involves analyzing patterns of human behavior in
order to predict what will happen in certain situations, assuming cer-
tain conditions are met." Explanation involves determining what fac-
tors best explain the occurrence of a past outcome such as those associ-
ated with past vehicle stops and searches. 69 In contrast, law is not
concerned with predicting future events because harm must have al-
ready occurred for individual civil rights litigants to bring their claims
of racial profiling."
Law has a distinct interest in causation that cannot be addressed
solely by statistical methodology—that of attributing responsibility to
individual law enforcement actors. 71 Policy justifications for responsi-
64 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465-66, 468 (1996); United
States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 967 (D. Neb. 2004); United States v. Lindsey, 288 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1204 (D. Kan. 2003).
w See Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, 95 .1. Am. STATISTICAL ASS'N
665, 665-69 (2000); STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law/  [hereinafter CAUSATION IN THE
LAW]
66 See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 665.
67 See id.	 •
68 See CAUSATION IN THE LAW, 5111/Fa note 65, at 1.
69 See id.
761 See id. at 2.
71 See id..
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bility and discretion in law enforcement stops and searches contribute
to this concept. 72
Although they differ in their focus on prediction versus attribu-
tion of responsibility, statistics and law overlap in their mutual goal of
explaining past behavior. 75 This overlap can be seen through the Ade-
quate Cause Theory, an argument that "an agency is a cause only if it
significantly increases the objective probability of the outcome that in
fact ensues."74 The Adequate Cause Theory stands for the proposition
that sufficiently strong statistical associations may constitute adequate
legal cause, thereby shifting the burden to the opponent to rebut that
inference of causation.75
Nonetheless, there is one caveat to equating statistical explanations
of past events to legal causation. 75 Although both fields aim to provide
explanations of past 'events, there is a fundamental limitation in the use
of social science data of racial profiling to explain individual litigants'
cases: there is a "difference between establishing statistical association. [in
72 See id.
" See CAUSATION IN TIIE LAW, supra note 65, at 3.
74 See id. at 7. Legal scholars such as Second Circuit judge Guido Calabresi have advo-
cated the Adequate Cause Theory. See id. This theory has been used extensively in jury
selection cases. See, e.g., Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.13 (1977). The Supreme
Court has stated that the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing
the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as
grand jurors, over a significant period of time." Id. at 494. This difference is basically a
comparison of two probabilities: the probability of serving on a jury for minorities, and the
probability of being selected for a jury among nonminority groups. Id. A large difference
in these probabilities demonstrates substantial jury underrepresentation. Id. If a plaintiff
can demonstrate such statistical disparity, he or she meets the prima facie burden of dis-
criminatory purpose, and the burden then shifts to the state to rebut that inference. Id.; sce
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972); United States v. Esquivel, 88 F.3d 722,
725 (9th Cir. 1996); State v. George, 503 S.E.2d 168, 172 (S.C. 1998).
Although the Adequate Cause Theory, which states that sufficiently strong statistical
associations may constitute adequate legal cause, has been adopted in many areas, there
are still inherent tensions between statistical truths and legal causes:
There is no reason to suppose that the law, when it engages in explanatory
inquiries, adopts different criteria of causation from those employed outside
the law in the physical and social sciences and in everyday life. However, even
here, requirements of proof may lead to a divergence.... As regards attribu-
tive uses of cause, the fact that the law has to attend simultaneously both to
the meaning of the terms importing causal criteria and to the purpose of le-
gal rules and their moral status makes the theory of causation a terrain of de-
bate which does not at present command general agreement and is likely to
remain controversial ....
See CAUSATION IN THE LAW, 51tPranote 65, at 7.
75 See Casteneda, 430 U.S. at 494 n.13, 495.
as See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 665.
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populations] and establishing actual causation in an individual case fil-
tered through our adversary legal system." 77 The use of statistics in ra-
cial profiling requires two levels of extrapolation: the assumptions (1)
that the individual plaintiffs experience is sufficiently similar to that of
the study population and (2) that the study population is sufficiently
indicative of the driver/violator population at large. 78 The question
then becomes, when are statistical associations so striking as to allow
one to extrapolate to the events of a particular case and infer that the
stop/search was the result of intentional discrimination? 79
Modern courts have always presented the opportunity for statisti-
cal studies to rise to the level of allowing for an inference of discrimi-
natory intent in individual litigants' cases.8° As the number of possible
other factors involved in law enforcement decision making increase,
however, it becomes more difficult to match an individual's experi-
ence with those of a study population that may differ in background
characteristics. 81 Nonetheless, the stronger the evidence of racial pro-
filing, the more likely any given member of the targeted minority
77 Id. (emphasis added).
78 See id.
79 See id. It is important to avoid one common fallacy when drawing analogies between
statistics and legal conclusions. See Barnes, supra note 29, at 191. It is a gross oversimplifica-
tion to state that courts will conclude that discrimination was the purpose of traffic
stops/searches if race was "more likely than not" the illegitimate cause for the stop. See id.
Such reasoning does not take policy concerns, social concerns, and other law enforcement
factors into consideration when evaluating vehicle stops. See id. at 201-04. It is similarly
inappropriate to claim that scientists have demonstrated a relationship between race and
vehicle stops/searches exists if the evidence is "statistically significant." See id. at 201. To
determine if a relationship exists, scientists examine not only statistical significance, but
also many other issues such as how sound the methods used to analyze data were, how
complete and accurate the data were, whether other possible influential factors were ade-
quately considered/adjusted for, and whether the sampled study population is sufficiently
similar to the driving population at large. See id. at 191.
ti° See, e.g., Armstrong 517 U.S. at 465 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 360
(1886), for the proposition that stark statistical evidence of disparate impact can be used to
infer discriminatory intent); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987) (same); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (same); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289 (1978) (same).
81 See e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294. Professor Theodore Eisenberg suggests that
strong statistical evidence was not sufficient in this particular litigant's case because it did
not account/adjust for the host of complex factors and multiple actors involved in capital
sentencing cases. See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 666. He noted that the prevalence of
these unmeasured, unaccounted-for factors "increased the likelihood that other factors
were responsible for racial effects." See id. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
suggested that adopting an internal benchmarking approach and analyzing individual
prosecutors' decision making, rather than using statewide summary data for capital sen-
tences, could overcome the Court's concerns in McCleskey. See id. at 667.
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group, including the plaintiff, will have been the victim of racial profil-
ing.82 Thus, the stronger the statistical association observed, the greater
the justification for individual plaintiffs use of population data to sup-
port his or her actual case.°
II. THE STATISTICS OF INTENT: MODERN APPROACHES TO THE
ANALYSIS OF RACIAL PROFILING DATA
A. Modern Data Collection Initiatives
In 1997, 1999, and 2001, U.S. Representative John Conyers intro-
duced legislation to address racial profiling. 84 The goal of these bills
was to end racial profiling by collecting data for monitoring and deter-
ring racial profiling, withholding federal funds in the event of non-
compliance with the proposed act, and implementing department
training programs to recognize and combat racial profiling practices
effectively.85 Although all three attempts to pass federal legislation
failed, states followed the lead and successfully passed legislation mod-
eled after Conyers's proposals.°
Currently, over half of all states have some form of data collection
methods in place to monitor racial profiling. 87 For example, in August
of 2000; the Massachusetts legislature passed Chapter 228, which re-
quires data collection on the characteristics of all drivers stopped for
alleged traffic violations by the Massachusetts State Police.° The data
recorded include the number of routine stops, the race and age of in-
dividual stopped, the alleged traffic infraction committed, whether a
search was conducted, the rationale for a search, whether contraband
was found, whether a warning or citation was issued as a result of the
stop, and whether an arrest was made following the stop. 89 To date,
62 See Lamber et al., supra note 18, at 590, 591 n.147.
83 See id. at 586.
84 See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001); Traffic Stops
Statistics Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999); Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997,
H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
65 See H.R. 2074.
88 See Suzanne Leone, Massachusetts Addresses Racial Profiling Head On: The Advocacy of
Chapter 228 of the Acts and Resolves of 2000, 28 NEW ENGLAND J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 335, 335-36 (2002).
87 Id. For an excellent compilation of information on current data collection measures
and ongoing legislation and litigation on the local, state, and federal levels, see Racial Pro-
filing Data Collection Res. Cir. at Ne. Univ., http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu
(last visited Oct. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Racial Profiling Data Collection].
88 See Leone, supra note 86, at 335.
69 See id. at 356.
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many states have enacted legislation similar to that of Massachusetts.°
Some states go even farther, however, by requiring data collection on all
municipal law enforcement levels, not just the state police. 91
-	 The Civil Rights Division (the "Division") of the U.S. Department
of Justice has also collected data on racial profiling through its ongo-
ing work in assessing the conduct of law enforcement agencies. 92 The
Division is charged with enforcing the police misconduct provision of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which
allows the Division to bring civil actions for declaratory relief against
law enforcement agencies engaging in patterns of racial profiling."
Justice Department investigations have assembled stop, traffic, and in
some cases, violator data, from police departments throughout the
United States, including: the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department; the. Los Angeles Police Department; the Columbus and
Steubenville, Ohio, Police Departments; the New Jersey State Police;
and the Pittsburgh Police Department.94
Recent racial profiling data analyses have utilized new informa-
tion available through the data collection initiatives described in this
Section and have addressed the limitations in drawing statistical infer-
ences described in Part 1.95 Two leading methods for racial profiling
" See Racial Profiling Data Collection, supra note 87.
9 ' See Leone, supra note 86, at 335-36.
92 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CM. RIGHTS DIV., SPECIAL L/TIG, SECTION, CONDUCT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/police.htm.
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). Section 14141 states:
(a) Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or
any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pat-
tern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers ... that deprives per-
sons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States,
(b) Civil action by Attorney General
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a viola-
tion of paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name
of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.
Id.
" See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIV. RIGHTS Div., SPECIAL LITIG. SECTION, DOCUMENTS
AND PUBLICATIONS (2007), http://www.usdoigov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#Law9620Enforce-
ment%20Misconduct%20Findings%20Letters (listing links to findings and settlements based
on data collected during law enforcement agency investigations in various jurisdictions).
" See supra notes 18-94 and accompanying text.
2008]	 Using Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent 	 277
data analysis are the "internal benchmarking" method and the "hit
rate" method.96
B. New Methods Designed to Detect ROcial Profiling
1. The Internal Benchmarking Method to Detect Racial Profiling
The "internal benchmarking" method uses comparisons between
officers within the same geographic area, time, and assignment as sta-
tistical evidence sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent. 97 The
justification for use of such data is that by "matching" on factors such
as geographic area patrolled, assignment given, and time of day on
patrol, one can compare different officers' behavior toward the same
baseline driving population and the same pool of violators, thereby
determining whether a certain officer stops a disproportionate num-
ber of drivers from a particular racial group." To analyze these data,
one need only do a simple statistical test for differences between the
mean number of stops of minority persons for each officer with simi-
lar assignments, geographic areas, and patrol times.99 For areas with
less data available, however, one may have to compare individual offi-
cers against the aggregate data of all other similar officers in order to
be able to make statistically sound comparisons.m
One of the key limitations of statistics has been the extrapolation
required to infer racial profiling in a particular litigant's situation
from statistical studies on general discrimination in the area. 101 Inter-
nal benchmarking reduces the amount of extrapolation required be-
cause, even though including data only on persons similarly situated
to the actual alleged victim of racial profiling instead of on the victim
herself, the study does actually contain data about the particular law
enforcement officer, allowing one to make inferences from his gen-
eral habits and patterns of profiling from available data. 1 °2
Another benefit of this method is that it allows for "matching" on
many of the other possible explanatory factors for a particular traffic
stop, thereby eliminating any hidden, nondiscriminatory rationale for
" See infra notes 97-126 and accompanying text.
97 See Smith, supra note 44, at 248.
" See id.
" See id. at 252.
100 See id.
091 See Barnes, supra note 29, at 204..
102 See Smith, supra note 44, at 241.
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a traffic stop or search. 103 Rates of traffic stops and searches can differ
according to different times of day, days of week, and geographical
areas, such as more patrolling in high-crime neighborhoods.'" When
making comparisons between officers, matching on these factors rules
them out as possible alternative explanations for any observed racial
disparity in stops/searches."5
A final benefit of the internal benchmarking method is that these
internal comparisons between officers are already being used as "agency
early warning systems to identify and intervene with potential problem
officers.""6 Thus, at least in theory, there are available data collection
methods already in place. 167 In addition, this approach is easily imple-
mented, because agencies need only collect stop data on driver race,
time, and stop location, which is already implemented across many law
enforcement agencies. 108 All comparisons among officers, concerning
the proportion of their stops that involved members of a racial group,
involve statistics that can be computed easily using spreadsheet soft-
ware. 109
There are, however, some crucial limitations in the ability of in-
ternal benchmarking to detect racial profiling.'" If racial profiling
discrimination is a department-wide problem, then this method will
only pick up the exceptionally horrific offender because one will be
comparing a bad apple to other bad apples." 1 Moreover, in small law
enforcement offices, data may be too scarce to detect differences be-
tween officers and identify particular offenders." 2 hi smaller depart-
ments, there simply may not be enough officers working in the same
geographic area, time, and assignment for comparison." 3
103 See Barnes, supra note 29, at 204.
104 See Smith, supra note 44, at 241-50.
1°5 Id.
106 Id. at 250.
107 Id.
1°5 See id. at 255.
Log See Smith, supra note 44, at 255. •
no See id.
pit See id.
112 See id.
1 " See id. at 256.
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2. The Hit Rate Theory of Racial Profiling
Several leading scholars have advocated the use of "hit rates" as a
bright-line empirical test for detecting racial profiling. 114 The goal of
this methodology is to "distinguish disparities reflecting discrimina-
tory intent from those that are inevitably generated in the bona fide
pursuit of crime."'" A "hit" is defined as a vehicle search that uncov-
ers illegal activity, most often drug possession.'" Proponents of a hit
rate analysis argue that one should not look at the number of vehicles
stopped because the decision to stop may be based on countless fac-
tors that can lead to successful law enforcement and just happen to be
associated with race as well.'" in contrast, the number of factors in-
volved when deciding to search a vehicle is far, fewer, given that a law
enforcement officer has already stopped a vehicle. 118
Under this theory, if racial profiling exists, it will result in a bias in
favor of searching minority vehicles at a rate that exceeds that which is
advantageous to the goals of law enforcement. 119 Thus regardless of
disproportionate rates of vehicles being stopped, racial profiling occurs
when the "hit rates" of minority drivers' vehicle searches are lower than
those of whites.'" These lower hit rates would indicate more un-
founded, unsuccessful searches against minorities, whereas if nontar-
geted groups' vehicles were searched, more illegal behavior would be
detected."' This theory basically likens a police officer's decision to
search to that of any rational economic actor, with irrational propor-
tions of unsuccessful searches of minority vehicles indicating racial pro-
filing. 122
The main benefit of this method is that it reduces the number of
other factors that must be considered and ruled out when determin-
ing whether racial profiling exists, at least from an economic perspec-
114 See, e.g., Nicola Persico & David A. Castleman, Detecting Bias: Using Statistical Evidence
to Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 217, 218;
David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and
Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 363-66 (2001).
116 See Persico & Castleman, supra note 114, at 223.
116 See id. at 217.
117 See id.
"a See id.
116 See id.
120 See Persico & Castleman, supra note 114, at 218.
121 See id.
1 " See id.
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tive.'23 In addition, this model may be welcomed by law enforcement
agencies because it could aid them in reviewing whether departments
are searching vehicles efficiendy. 124
This method has been met with opposition by civil rights advo-
cates, however, because it does not answer the question of whether po-
lice are engaging in racial profiling, but only whether the police de-
partment's racial profiling is "rational," i.e., leads to more successful
searches. 125 Another limitation of this method is that harassment due to
unwarranted stops and police questioning will not be detected by the
hit rate method so long as the detaining officer does not eventually de-
cide to search the vehicle.' 26
III. INDIVIDUAL CIVIL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT ABUSES
A. Avenue for Recovery: Equal Protection Claims
Until relatively recently, individual litigants typically relied on the
Fourth Amendment to bring claims of racial discrimination in traffic
stops and subsequent searches and seizures.'" In 1996, in Whren v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that so long as there is an
objectively reasonable basis for stopping a driver, the Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit use of race or ethnicity as one.of the totality of
factors leading to a stop, search, or seizure. 128 The Court thus fore-
closed relief under the Fourth Amendment for all but the rarest of
cases where an officer admits that the traffic stop was motivated solely
' 23 See Katherine Y Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction
Absent Racial Profiling 54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1101 (2005); Bernard Harcourt, Rethinking Racial
Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Crimi-
nal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 1275, 1280-95 (2004).
124 See Barnes, supra note 123, at 1101.
127 See id,
128 See Harcourt, supra note 123, at 1280-95.
127 Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling
Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1829 (2000). It has been suggested that racial profiling
claims were rarely based on equal protection grounds prior to United States u Whren because
intentional discrimination was considered prohibitively difficult to litigate successfully. Id.
Since Whim, attention has shifted to equal protection claims, as the Fourth Amendment now
seems to be the larger obstacle for alleged victims of racial profiling. See id.
128 See 517 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1996) (holding that a Fourth Amendment challenge is
not viable so long as there is at least another independent justification for the search in
addition to race, and noting that few police officers would ever state that vehicle occu-
pant's race was the sole basis).
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by the vehicle occupant's race. 129 But the Court did state, in dicta, that
selective enforcement of the law was prohibited under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,'" suggesting it as a
more appropriate avenue for challenges of selective enforcement and
racial profiling in traffic stops. 15'
In 1976, in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court set out the
equal protection analysis for modern racial profiling claims.'" The
Court stated that "our cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a ra-
cially disproportionate impact."'" In establishing that an equal protec-
tion claim must allege both disparate impact and discriminatory intent,
the Court held:
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the
fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 'heavily on one race
than another. ... Nevertheless, we have not held that a law,
129 See id.
130 Id. at 813 ("We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits se-
lective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.").
131 See id. In addition to Equal Protection claims, individual claims for relief may be
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Md.
State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 567
(D. Md. 1999) (stating that Title VI implied a private right of action for racial profiling
victims, but noting that the requirements for successful Title VI actions are not as clearly
settled by the courts as the requirements for equal protection claims are). The court held
that because the plaintiffs had stated detailed allegations of intentional discrimination,
their equal protection claim should not be defeated on a summary judgment motion. Id.
judge Blake, however, went on to state that "whether a private right of action exists under
the Title VI regulation prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination is less well settled." Id.
Thus, it is unclear whether the burden on plaintiff alleging racial profiling under Title VI
is any different than that of the civil plaintiff in equal protection claims. See id. Indeed,
only a year later, in Rodriguez u California Highway Patrol, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California held that civil plaintiffs alleging a Title VI violation must
prove intent to discriminate at trial. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
I" See 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976). In this case, two African-American police officers
alleged that the policies of the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police were racially dis-
criminatory. Id. at 232. In particular, they alleged that department testing measures had
the impact of excluding a disproportionately high number of African-American applicants,
as compared with white applicants. Id. The plaintiff officeis claimed that the test 'bore no.
relationship to job performance and 'has a highly discriminatory impact in screening out
black candidates.'" Id. at 235 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C.
1972)).
133 See id. at 239.
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neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater pro-
portion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidi-
ous racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 134
Post-Davis cases have further confirmed that to succeed on a claim of
race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must
prove not only disparate impact but also discriminatory intent. 135
B. Applying Equal Protection Analysis to Claims Alleging Racial Profiling:
The Virtual Roadblock of Proving Discriminatory Intent
To succeed on a claim under the Equal Protection Clause in the
context of selective enforcement due to racial profiling, plaintiffs
must show not only that the law enforcement agency's and/or offi-
cer's stop practices have a disparate impact on plaintiff's racial group,
but also that these practices constitute an intentional pattern of dis-
crimination.'" The nearly insurmountable discriminatory intent re-
quirement has been criticized as essentially a complete bar, making
equal protection claims due to racial profiling virtually illusory. 137
First, to prove discriminatory impact, plaintiffs face the burden of
showing that similarly situated persons of another race are not stopped
by police in the same manner as plaintiff's racial group)" This may be
difficult because of the unavailability of data on whom the particular
officer or agency could have stopped but did not. 159 Instead, plaintiffs
1" See id. at 242. The Court did note some exceptions where discriminatory impact
alone is sufficient for equal protection claims. See id. at 241. In particular, the Court stated
that in jury selection cases, the "systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal
application of the law as to show intentional discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Akins v.
Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945)).
135 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). In Armstrong defen-
dants moved for discovery after being indicted for selling crack and using firearms for the
purpose of drug trafficking. See id. at 458. The Supreme Court held that "to establish a
discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated indi-
viduals of a different race were not prosecuted," and the defendants must show that the
actions taken by the state were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id.
155 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 465; Smith, supra note 44, at 239.
157 See Sarah Oliver, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: The Disappearing Fourth Amendment
and Its Impact on Racial Profiling-,. 23 WHIT 	 L. REv. 1099, 1113-14 (2002).
138
 See Smith, supra note 44, at 238.
139 See, e.g., Nat'l Cong. for P.R. Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 158-59,
167 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Plaintiffs alleged that the New York City Police Department's Street
Crime Unit engaged in racial profiling during their practice of suspicionless stops and
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are relegated to offering statistical evidence designed to show that
members of their racial group were stopped disproportionately to their
percentage in the population."° Courts typically allow such statistical
evidence to demonstrate discriminatory impact but do not allow such
evidence to demonstrate intent. 141
In general, courts reject the use of aggregate population statistics
to prove discriminatory intent towards a particular plaintiff. 142 Unless
all officer openly admits that a suspect's race influenced his or her de-
cision to stop or search plaintiffs vehicle, a plaintiff is left to argue that
any circumstantial or statistical evidence of the discriminatory effect
they suffered is so strong that it is tantamount to proof of intent. 143
Courts widely reject this argument in all but the most extreme cases.'"
frisks, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 158. The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim because
they failed to provide evidence that similarly situated white pedestrians were not subjected
to the stop and frisk measures. See id. at 167-68. The court articulated the disparate impact
requirement quite strictly:
Plaintiffs would not meet this requirement even if they alleged that only black
and Hispanic residents were subjected to suspicionless stops. See Armstrong,
517 U.S. at 470 (statistical evidence showing that all defendants prosecuted
during a certain year were black fails to satisfy similarly situated require-
ment—the study "failed to identify individuals who were not black and could
have been prosecuted for the offense for which respondents were charged,
but were not so . prosecuted"). Without a showing of different treatment of
similarly situated persons, either through statistical or other evidence, plain-
tiffs' Equal Protection claim is dismissed.
See id. at 167.
140
 See Smith, supra note 44, at 239.
141 See, e.g., United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153-63 (D. Kan. 2004)
(finding that statistical evidence of officers stopping Hispanic and black drivers more fre-
' quently than white drivers who committed similar traffic violations was sufficient to allege
discriminatory effect but not intent). In Duque-Nava, the defendant officer stopped far
greater percentages of black and Hispanic drivers than other officers patrolling a nearby
stretch of the same highway, thereby allowing the court to find that his actions created a
disparate impact on black and Hispanic drivers, as compared with white drivers. See id, at
1157. In particular, other officers patrolling I-70.made traffic stops that were approxi-
mately 6.8% Hispanic motorists and 5.7% black motorists, whereas the officer accused of
racial profiling patrolled the same highway approximately 100 miles away and made traffic
stops that were 33.69% Hispanic motorists—far more than expected, even allowing for
some variability between the number of Hispanic drivers from one stretch of the highway
to the next. Id. Nonetheless, even in the presence of such a striking statistical disparity
(6.8% versus 33.69%), the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas was unwilling to
allow the use of this evidence to infer discriminatory intent. See id. at 1160-62.
142 See Smith, supra note 44, at 243. 	 •
Its See id.
144 See, e.g., Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 360 (1886).
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In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in McCloskey v. Kemp illus-
trated the high bar to using statistical evidence to infer intent. 145 There,
the Court held that a statistically significant study of hundreds of homi-
cide prosecutions over several years in Georgia was insufficient to dem-
onstrate discriminatory intent in death penalty prosecutions. 146 Even
though convicted murderers of white victims were several times more
likely to be sentenced to death than convicted murderers of black vic-
tims, the Court reasoned that there were too many other nondiscrimi-
natory factors involved when deciding whether to seek the death pen-
alty, and thus courts must generally defer to prosecutorial discretion."7
C. Early Cases and Exceptions to the Rule: Where Disparate Impact Is So
Severe as to Support an Inference of Discriminatory Intent
In a few earlier cases, courts have held that the statistical evidence
of discriminatory impact was so striking that it allowed an inference of
discriminatory intent.' 46 In 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the statistical evidence of racial discrimination
against Chinese business owners was so overwhelming that it allowed
the Court to infer discriminatory intent."9 The Court struck down a
San Francisco ordinance requiring wooden-frame laundry business op-
erators to obtain a permit allowing them to continue operating in the
city. 150 Approximately 200 Chinese laundry owners were denied per-
mits, whereas 80 other owners, all non-Chinese, obtained permits and
were allowed to keep their businesses open. 151 The. Court found that
both Chinese and non-Chinese owners operated their businesses in
similar manners under similar building conditions, eliminating nondis-
criminatory reasons for the disparate impact of the ordinance on Chi-
nese owners. 152 The Court concluded that this overwhelming evidence
alone was sufficient to rule the ordinance unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 153
145 See generally 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
"6 See id. at 293-97.
le See id.
148 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Vick Wo, 118 U.S. at 360.
149 See 118 U.S. at 360.
IN See id. at 356..
181 See id.
162 See id.
166 See id. at 360. Although modern courts often cite Yick Wo, there is little indication
that they actually use the case to support the proposition that sufficiently strong statistical
evidence of discriminatory impact implies discriminatory intent. See Oliver, supra note 137,
2008]	 Using Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent 	 285
In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court once again found that
overwhelming statistical evidence of disparate impact was sufficient to
infer discriminatory intent. 154 The Court found that the Alabama leg-
islature's redrawing of the Tuskegee city boundaries in a manner that
excluded all but 4 or 5 of its 400 African-American voters without ex-
cluding any white voters or residents was an unconstitutional prac-
tice. 155 justice Frankfurter concluded that:
If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or
unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount
for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration,
that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white
and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as
to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote. 156
This overwhelming statistical evidence of voter exclusion led the Court
to conclude that under the Fifteenth Amendment, or alternatively on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, such compelling statistical disparities
were conclusive evidence of discriminatory intent. 157
D. Modern Uses of Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling to
Infer Discriminatory Intent
A notable exception to the historical judicial view on the insuffi-
ciency of statistical evidence in establishing discriminatory intent is
found in the 1996 New jersey Superior Court decision, State v. Sota. 158
There, the court held that the unrebutted statistical evidence of racial
profiling was sufficient to establish discriminatory intent as required
at 1113-14. Some have argued that courts should reconsider and utilize the dormant dicta
of Yick Wo. See id. at 1123-26.
154 See 364 U.S. at 341.
155 See id. Petitioners alleged both Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations, as
the legislature's redefining Tuskegee city boundaries also excluded former residents from
voting on municipal matters. Id. at 340. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, found
the legislature's actions unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, whereasfustice
Whittaker's concurring opinion suggests that he found the Fourteenth Amendment to be
the more appropriate avenue for recovery. See id. at 346; id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concur-
ring).
156 See id. at 341 (majority opinion). Not all scholars applaud the media attention and
subsequent data proliferation that followed. See Gandy, supra note 19, at 149-50. Professor
Oscar Gandy argues that statisticians and data collectors have compromised their usual
standards of accuracy and restraint to cater to the public , interest and societal debate sur-
rounding racial profiling. See id.
157 See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
155 See 734 A.2d 350,360 (N,1. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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for equal protection claims of selective enforcement. 159 The criminal
defendant successfully moved to suppress evidence resulting from a
traffic stop that was the result of racial discrimination.'" The court
stated that "while defendants have the burden of proving 'the exis-
tence of purposeful discrimination,' discriminatory intent may be in-
ferred from statistical proof presenting a stark pattern or an even less
extreme pattern in certain limited contexts. "161
In contrast, in 2004, in United. States v. Duque-Nava, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Kansas found that the statistical evidence of
racial profiling, although sufficient to show discriminatory impact, was
not strong enough to support an inference of intent) 62 Nonetheless, in
dicta, the court in Duque-Nava suggested another possible avenue for
finding discriminatory intent using statistics.'" The court stated:
"[a]lthough statistics alone are generally viewed as insufficient evidence
of intent, certainly a comparison of an officer's stops with similarly situ-
ated officers in his own police department might be evidence of an of-
ficer's particular pattern of discriminatory intent or motive."'"
In 2004, in Anderson v. Cori*, African American women who were
targeted for airport searches presented statistical evidence that searches
done on African-American women were less successful—i.e., less likely
to fuld contraband—than in other less-targeted groups, revealing racial
profiling bias that did not aid law enforcement efforts. 165 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that It] he implication
is that Customs inspectors searched [African-American] women with
less by way of suspicion than they required before they would search
Hispanics or black men (though black women seem to have been
treated similarly to both white men and white women)."'" The court
159
 See id. at 352.
"0 See id.
36' See id. at 360. Some scholars have suggested that Soto can be distinguished from
McCleshey in part because of the relatively fewer variables involved with the decision to or-
der a vehicle to stop compared with those involved in determining whether to seek the
death penalty. See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work Racial Profiling and
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651,724-25 (2002). They argue that the
fewer the number of variables affecting police decision making, the easier it is to detect
the influence of race. See id. Other cases involving racial profiling in traffic stops and
searches across the United States, however, have not echoed this argument, and thus, Soto
remains an anomaly in many respects. See id. at 723-27.
162 See 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-63.
163 See id. at 1163.
1 €4 See id.
165 See 355 F.3d 1021,1023 (7th Cir. 2004).
166 See id.
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rejected the use of statistics in this particular case to infer discrimina-
tory intent, but suggested that if better data had been available, the
outcome would have been otherwise.'" These data collection limita-
tions made it difficult to argue that racial profiling, and not some other,
nondiscriminatory factor, was the reason for the search. 168
The Soto, Duque-Nava, and Anderson courts differed in the types of
statistical data and analyses presented and in whether the courts ulti-
mately allowed the use of statistics to infer intent. 169 Nonetheless, all
three decisions demonstrate the courts' willingness to weigh the
strength of statistical evidence carefully, on a case-by-case basis, instead
of applying a categorical exclusion, when deciding whether statistics
could be used to infer discriminatory intent. 170
IV. STRONG STATISTICAL ASSOCIATIONS FROM WELL-DESIGNED
STUDIES SHOULD BE USED BY COURTS TO INFER
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT IN RACIAL PROFILING CLAIMS
A. Marked Improvements in Data Quantity and Quality Since the U.S.
Supreme Court Last Considered Whether Statistics Can Be
Used to Prove Discriminatory Intent
Although aggregate statistical evidence of the past was insuffi-
cient to establish discriminatory intent in the vast majority of cases,
there has been a recent, rapid increase in the collection and quality of
data on racial profiling.'" These practices are designed to monitor
and provide early warning systems that avoid racial profiling.'" Re-
searchers have noted that only in the past few years have reliable data
been collected and analyzed for the first time on racial profiling.'"
To address past weakness in the quality and quantity of traffic,
violator, and stop data available, federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment agencies, as well as independent organizations, have enacted
measures to collect and analyze data on traffic stops. 174 These prac-
167 see id.
165 See id. at 1024; see also Duque.Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
169 See Anderson, 355 F.3d at 1023; Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-63; Soto, 734
A.2d at 360.
17° See Anderson, 355 F.3d at 1023; Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-63; Soto, 734
A.2d at 360.
171 See Eggen, supra note 7.
172 See Rudovsky, Myra note 114, at 363.
175
 See id.
174 See RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
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tices are designed to monitor and provide early warning systems that
avoid racial profs ling. 175
Various organizations have developed their own statistical data-
bases to study racial profiling, including university social scientists, in-
dependent researchers, the American Civil Liberties Union (the
"ACLU"), and the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (the "NAACP"). 176
 Both the ACLU and the NAACP have
collected data by establishing hotlines for reporting incidents of racial
profiling by individuals subjected to traffic stops.'" More prominently,
these groups have been successful in launching campaigns to pass legis-
lation at the state and local level, pursuing cases, providing assistance
for individuals to bring civil suits alleging racial profiling, and sponsor-
ing independent researchers' attempts to collect data on racial profil-
ing for future litigation.im
B. Modern Courts Begin to Recognize that Statistical Studies of
Racial Profiling Have Corrected for Past Weaknesses
and Addressed Concerns of the Courts
The last U.S. Supreme Court decision to expand substantially on
the use of statistical evidence to infer intent was in 1960, in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot. 179
 Several lower courts, however, have recently expanded
the line of cases in which statistics can infer intent. 180 This Section
demonstrates that lower courts are implicitly adopting the modern
statistical methods discussed in Part 11. 181 It "reinterprets" the legal
standards for the cases presented in Part II1.D using the data analysis
terminology from Part I to show that not only are these methods ap-
propriate for use in litigation, but also that judges are capable of ac-
176 See Rudovsky, =PM note 114, at 363.
176 See Weatherspoon, supra note 5, at 757.
177 Id.; see David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal justice: The Signifi-
cance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 71,85 (2003). Among the work of uni-
versities and social scientists, the efforts of Dr. John Lamberth are perhaps most widely
known because of his research work for civil rights complainants in the successful legal
actions taken against both the New Jersey and Maryland state police departments. See id.
Lamberth designed studies to collect both traffic and violator data assembled teams to
carry out the studies, and compared state police stop data to these background popula-
tions as an expert witness for alleged victims of racial profiling. See id. His efforts influ-
enced the subsequent measures taken by the New Jersey and Maryland state police de-
partments to combat their highly publicized problems of racial profiling. See id.
na See Weatherspoon, supra note 5, at 757.
179 See 364 U.S. 339,347-48 (1960).
leo See United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144,1162-63 (D. Kan. 2004).
tat See supra notes 84-126 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
2008]	 Using Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent 	 289
curately assessing the quality of statistical evidence available. 182 Thus, a
categorical exclusion of statistical evidence to demonstrate discrimi-
natory intent is inappropriate. 183
The lower court decisions discussed below demonstrate the ability
of courts to recognize the types of studies capable of demonstrating
discriminatory intent and to develop judicial guidelines and standards
for when statistical evidence is sufficient to establish prima facie dis-
criminatory intenliM These decisions have embraced the new analyti-
cal techniques discussed in Part 11—improved data collection tech-
niques, internal benchmarking, and the hit rate method—even though
they do not expressly acknowledge the adoption of these methods in
their analyses. 185 All that remains is for courts to acknowledge these
new statistical tools formally so that coherent guidelines for their use by
courts can be developed, and statistics can play a larger, yet accurate
and responsible role in racial profiling litigation. 188 The adoption of
these methods by the courts supports the argument that new statistical
methods have coincided with an evolution in the way courts view the
power of statistical evidence to prove discriminatory intent. 187
1. State u Soto: A Novel Judicial Analysis That Recognizes Improved
Study Design and Traffic, Violator, and Stop Data Collection
Techniques
In 1999, in State v. Soto, the New Jersey Superior Court established
general guidelines for the type of statistical evidence sufficient to
demonstrate intent. 188 In establishing these guidelines, the court im-
plicitly held that adequate stop, traffic, and violator data collection
and analyses can be used to infer discriminatory intent. 188 It stated:
Statistics may be used to make out a case of targeting minori-
ties for prosecution of traffic offenses provided the compari-
son is between the racial composition of the motorist popu-
lation violating the traffic laws and the racial composition of
182 See supra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
184 See infra notes 188-236 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 84-126; infra notes 188-236 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 89-126 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
lea See 734 A.2d 350,360-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
189 See id. at 360.
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those arrested for traffic infractions on the relevant roadway
patrolled by the police agency.'"
Thus, the court suggested that if reliable stop data is available and vio-
lator data can be obtained to establish a standard against which to
compare the stop data, this evidence may be sufficient to demonstrate
discriminatory in ten 1. 191
It is unclear whether traffic data is a sufficient standard with
which to compare stop data, as the New Jersey Superior Court never
directly addresses this issue, and all three types of data—traffic, viola-
tor, and stop data—were presented in Soto. 192 First, Soto examined the
stop data available.' 93
 Both plaintiff and defendant randomly selected
stop data and found that 1212 of the stops recorded motorist's race.'"
Thus, adequacy of sample size and representativeness of the general
population were not of concern.'" Second, traffic data and violator
data were collected in an independent study for the criminal defen-
dant alleging racial profiling. 196
 The court described the methodology
for surveying drivers and recording data in detail, including how traf-
fic data were collected at various times of day along several portions of
the New Jersey Turnpike in the same geographical area as where the
defendant was stopped by police.' 97
 Violator data was calculated by
having researchers calibrate their speedometer, set cruise control at
the speed limit, and record the number of cars and the race of motor-
ists who were speeding past them. 198
 Finally, in addition to outlining
the protocol for these data collection measures, expert witnesses testi-
fied to the validity of all the crucial issues of study design, data collec-
tion, and data analysis.'"
Using these data, researchers found that 46.2% of all stops in-
volved black motorists, as calculated from stop data; 13.5% of all driv-
ers using the highway were black, as calculated from traffic data; and
15% of all speed limit violators were black, as calculated from violator
data.m Since the traffic baseline of 13.5% and the violator compari-
190 Id.
191 See id. at 350.
192 See id. at 360.
293 See 739 A.2d at 352.
194 See id.
193 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See Soto, 734 A.2d at 352.
199
 See id. at 353.
200 See id.
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son group baseline of 15% were so similar, either could be used to
determine whether the percentage of black motorists stopped was
disproportionate to either the number of black motorists or the num-
ber of black speed limit violators. 201
The court concluded that there was such stark evidence of dis-
crimination-32.7% absolute difference in percentage of black motor-
ists stopped versus percentage of those on the roadways, and 16.35
standard deviations above the expected value of the difference of 0%
under the hypothesis that drivers were stopped in proportion to their
presence on the roadways—that one could infer discriminatory in-
tent. 202 This conclusion is actually an implicit adoption of the Adequate
Cause Theory discussed in Part I, which stands for the proposition that
sufficiently strong statistical associations may constitute adequate legal
cause, thereby shifting the burden to the opponent to rebut that infer-
ence of causation. 2" Indeed, results are deemed statistically significant
at two standard deviations, where the greater the standard deviation,
the larger the statistical discrepancy between the treatment of the two
observed driving populations, minority and nonminority drivers. 204
2. United States v. Duque-Nava: A judicial Opinion That Recognizes
Improved Methodology of Internal Benchmarking May Be Used to
Infer Discriminatory Intent
In 2004, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, in United
States v. Duque-Nava, held that the statistical evidence of racial profiling
presented was not strong enough to support an inference of intent. 205
Nonetheless, the court implicitly suggested another possible avenue for
finding discriminatory intent using statistics."6 The court stated:
"(allthough statistics alone are generally viewed as insufficient evidence
of intent, certainly a comparison of an officer's stops with similarly situ-
ated officers in his own police department might be evidence of an of-
ficer's particular pattern of discriminatory intent or motive."207
201 See id.
2°2 See id.
2" See S010, 734 A.2d at 353; supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also Cas-
teneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
204 See Soto, 734 A.2d at 360; supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing statistical
evidence), In Soto, the probability of observing an absolute difference of 32.7% or an even
more extreme result, if black and white drivers really had been targeted equally, was less
than 5%. 734 A.2d at 353.
405 See 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-63.
2°6 See id. at 1163.
207 See id.
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The technique hinted at in the above quotation is actually the in-
ternal benchmarking method explained in Part I of this Note. 208
 Al-
though the court in Duque-Nava never formally mentions, much less
adopts, the internal benchmarking method, its description of sufficient
statistical evidence corresponds to the same standards that quantitative
researchers use."9
 The court implied that internal benchmarking may
be a preferred method for showing intent because by "matching" on
factors such as geographic area patrolled, assignment given, and time
of day on patrol, one can compare different officers' behavior toward
the same baseline driving population and the same pool of violators,
thereby determining whether a certain officer stops a disproportionate
number of drivers from a particular racial group. 210
3. Anderson v. Corntjo: Considering the Hit Rate Theory to Detect
Discriminatory intent
Writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
2004, in Anderson v. Corn4o, judge Easterbrook implicitly demonstrated
that courts can successfully evaluate applications of the hit rate method
to determine whether results are sufficient to infer intent. 211
 Of Afri-
can-American women subjected to searches at airports, 27.6% were
found to have contraband, compared with 25.1% for Caucasian men
and 19.5% for Caucasian women. 212
 Using the language of economet-
rists and statisticians, these percentages are actually "hit rates" as dis-
cussed in Part II. 215
 Although the hit rates are similar among the above
groups, African-American women had hit rates substantially lower than
lesser-targeted groups of African-American men and Hispanic men and
women, with hit rates of 61.6%, 58.8%, and 45.7%, respectively. 214
2°5
 See id. at 1164.
2" SCE id. at 1162-63.
210 See Smith, supra note 44, at 248. To analyze internal benchmarking data, one need
only do a simple statistical test for differences between the mean number of stops of mi-
nority persons for all officers with similar assignments, geographic areas, and patrol times.
Id. But for smaller law enforcement agency offices or in cases alleging systematic, agency-
wide abuse, this method will not work because one will simply be comparing one bad ap-
ple with others. See id. at 252.
Professor Michael Smith provides further support for "internal benchmarking" to de-
termine discriminatory intent by noting that these internal comparisons between officers
are already being used as agency early warning systems to identify and intervene with po-
tential problem officers. See id. at 237-39.
211 See 355 F.3d 1021,1022 (7th Cir. 2004).
212 see id.
215 See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Anderson).
214 See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
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Judge Easterbrook implicitly made a comparison of hit rates when he
wrote that "[t] he implication is that Customs inspectors searched [Afri-
can-American] women with less by way of suspicion than they required
before they would search Hispanics or black men (though black
women seem to have been treated similarly to both white men, and
women)."2"
The court rejected the use of hit rate data to infer discriminatory
intent in that case for four specific reasons, but it did not appear to
strike down the hit rate method itself in the event that these other
limitations involving data collection could be resolved. 216 First, the
data reported were not sampled from the same year as when the al-
leged violations occurred, thus making it difficult to extrapolate from
the study population results to the individual litigants. 217 This weak-
ness, however, is likely to be corrected, given that data collection is
now a permanent, ongoing effort, so that plaintiffs will not have to
commission data collection studies post-harm in order to litigate. 218
Second, the data were national estimates of stops and searches, not
those based solely on Chicago O'Hare International Airport, where
plaintiffs were subject to search. 219 This presents the same problems
mentioned in Part I of this Note, discussing the difficulty of drawing
conclusions about a population using data taken from other sources. 220
Third, data on potential factors leading to searches other than
race were not collected, such as purchasing tickets in cash, arriving
from some specific destinations, lengths of stay, and other past crimi-
nal conduct of travelers. 221 This is the problem discussed in Part I
concerning the need to eliminate other nondiscriminatory character-
istics that could explain the observed discrepancy in hit rates.
Finally, the data did not include observations taken on the actual
defendants in this case, making it more difficult to extrapolate from
• 215 Anderson, 355 F.3d. at 1024.
215 See id. Scholarly debate continues over what this decision actually meant for the hit-
rate theory debate. Compare Persica & Castleman, supra note 114, at 218 (advocating the use
of "hit rates" as a bright-line empirical test for detecting racial profiling), and Harcourt, supra
note 123, at 1303 (advocating the use of the hit rate method), with Jeff Dominitz, How Do the
Laws of Probability COnstrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial Profiling?, 5 AM. L. &
EcoN. REV. 412,424-46 (2003) (noting the limitations of this theory in proving intent).
217 See Anderson, 355 F.3d at 1023.
218 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing current police data collec-
tion initiatives).
23° See Anderson, 355 F.3d at 1023.
2" See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in drawing
conclusions about individual litigants using population level statistics).
221 See Anderson, 355 F.3d at 1024.
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the study population to the original plaintiffs. 222
 The above data col-
lection limitations make it difficult to argue that racial profiling, and
not some other, nondiscriminatory factor, was the reason for the
search. 223
 The hit rate method, however, has only recently been intro-
duced in the courtroom, and further advancements in data collection
will lead to stronger study reliability, making the argument for using
statistics to infer discriminatory intent more persuasive.224
4. Analogizing to Capital Sentencing Cases: A New Willingness to
Consider When Statistics Prove Discriminatory Intent
Capital sentencing cases are another area in which recent dicta
suggests a willingness to reconsider the use of statistics to prove dis-
criminatory intent in prosecuting and sentencing. 225
 Whereas in 1987,
in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court was unwilling to accept state-
wide data on capital sentencing as evidence of discriminatory intent in
an individual convict's case, in recent years, the Court has suggested
that adopting.an internal benchmarking approach and analyzing indi-
vidual prosecutors' decision making, rather than using statewide sum-
mary data for capital sentences, could overcome the Court's concerns
in McCleskey. 226
 Nonetheless, this dicta has yet to be acted upon, as
courts failed to sustain a single-race based challenge to the death pen-
alty in the thirteen years following Mcaeskey.227
Recent examples like Soto demonstrate the ability of courts to
take a sophisticated approach to determining when statistics show in-
tent. 228
 Courts cannot avoid grappling with the reliability of statistical
methodology when determining whether statistics should play a role
in any Fourteenth Amendment claims of racial profiling. 229
 Courts are
already required to determine what type of statistical evidence is suffi-
cient to demonstrate disparate impact, and new data and methods
mean that they should now determine what types of evidence meet
222 See id.
222
 See id.; supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
224 See Persico & Castleman, supra note 114, at 218.
"2 See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 667. It is also interesting to note that Justice Powell,
who wrote for the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp, later changed his mind on the use of statis-
tics and capital sentencing. See David Von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand on Death Pen-
alty, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at Al.
226 See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 667; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-
97 (1987).
222 See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 667.
226 See generally 734 A.2d 350.
"9 See id.
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the prima facie hurdle of discriminatory intent as well. 2" As with rele-
vancy and expert statistical evidence decisions already confronting the
courts, they must address the soundness of statistical methodology
and the reliability of statistical estimates of racial profiling."'
No single method should be adopted—rather the new data col-
lection methods, internal benchmarking, and hit rate theories can all
be utilized to infer discriminatory intent. 252 This flexibility is essential
given that the nature of a particular civil litigant's claims will differ
based on the amount and types of data available. 233
Courts have shown an ability to take a sophisticated and thor-
ough approach to examining the adequacy of statistical evidence. 234
With the improved statistical approaches to detecting racial profiling,
courts should now assume a gate-keeping role for deciding which sta-
tistical studies can be used to meet the prima facie burden of proving
discriminatory intent. 235 A categorical exclusion of statistical evidence
to prove discriminatory intent would undermine the spirit of early
cases, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Gomalion v. Lightfoot, and would
shortchange recent developments in legal scholarship that recognize
the power of statistics to prove discriminatory intent. 236
C. Coherency in the Law: The Role Statistics Already Plays in
Other Discrimination Contexts
In both . voting and employment discrimination cases, courts al-
low the use of statistical methods to shift the burden to the defendant
to prove some nondiscriminatory moiive. 237 In cases involving Title
VII claims and disproportionate exclusion of minority citizens from
jury venires, courts have already recognized that the strong disparate
impact in the treatment of minorities alone is sufficient to demon-
strate intentional discrirnination.238 For disparate treatment employ-
ment cases, statistical analyses may be used to demonstrate discrimina-
tory intent if the analysis is based on a sufficiently large sample size,
2
" See supra notes 138-147 and accompanying text.
231 See, e.g., supra notes 84-126 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 171-187 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 171-187 and accompanying text.
234 See Barnes, supra note 29, at 206.
233
 See id.
233 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 360 (1886); Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d at
1162-63; Soto, 734 A.2d at 360-61.
237 Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 667; see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398-403
(1986); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-96 (1986).
238 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-96.
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the dataset characteristics are sufficiently similar to the plaintiffs
work characteristics, and the resulting estimate of deviation from the
nondiscriminatory workplace norm is statistically significant. 239 Thus,
the use of data of sufficient quality and quantity when conducting sta-
tistical analyses warrants the inference of discriminatory intent in em-
ployment cases. 24°
Similarly, courts have relied heavily on statistical evidence in jury
selection discrimination cases over the past several decades. 2" For ex-
ample, the analysis of the validity of a defendant's claims that he or
she was indicted by an unconstitutionally selected grand jury often
centers on statistical evidence. 242 In addition, statistics play an increas-
ingly significant role in other courtroom contexts, such as jury con-
sulting, change of forum due to public bias, and as prima facie evi-
dence of causation in tort cases. 243
D. Solid Statistical Methodology and Sound Social Policy
Statistics can be used to demonstrate far more than just the stark
levels of racial profiling by law enforcement officials across the United
States—they also reveal the large social costs of such practices. 244 Sta-
tistical and legal analyses alike have detected that "each encounter
that an 'innocent' or non-offending [racial minority] has with the po-
lice increases their sense of alienation, resentment, and disregard for
the police and for the criminal justice system." 245 In a 2000 national
survey, the Bureau ofJustice Statistics found that fifty-seven percent of
Caucasians stated they "had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence
in the police," but only thirty-eight percent of African-Americans had
similar levels of confidence in law enforcement. 2"
239 See 6 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 57:37 (2007).
240 See
241 See supra note 74 (discussing jury selection cases and the use of statistical evidence
to meet the prima facie burden of discriminatory intent and shift the burden to rebut to
defendant) .
242 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 799.
242
	 Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 667.
244 Harcourt, supra note 123, at 1303. In addition to the negative social effects 'of dis-
crimination against minorities, Professor Bernard Harcourt argues that racial profiling will
lead to higher crime rates because the non minority group will be more likely to transport
drugs due to the fact that such drivers have become aware that their chances of being
stopped and searched are lower than others. Id.
245 Gandy, supra note 19, at 154.
245 See PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 28
(2001), http://www.oj p.usdoj.gov/bjs/pu b/pdf/cpp99.pdf.
20081	 Using Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent 	 297
In addition to the social costs of disenfranchisement and disillu-
sionment with law enforcement, there is a chilling effect on racial pro-
filing victims seeking redress because the state and local agencies ac-
cused of racial profiling are the very ones possessing information
regarding discriminatory motives. 247 These agencies have the greatest
access to data collected by officers in the field, citations recorded, and
complaints alleged against individual officers. 245 Such agencies should
not be allowed to secure immunity from litigation over civil rights
abuses simply because they can hide behind the hurdle of proving dis-
criminatory intent.243 Greater public access to data on traffic stops and
searches would shed light on the activities of law enforcement agencies,
allowing for public "enforcement" and oversight to ensure nondis-
criminatory practices. 25°
Furthermore, strong statistical associations should support an
inference of discriminatory intent. 251 This would compensate for the
fact that proving intent directly in an area with such broad police dis-
cretion and such little evidence as to an individual's subjective mental
state makes proving that racial profiling caused the traffic stop nearly
impossible. 252 Scholars have noted that the standard set for the bur-
den of proof is often determinative "because disproving causation is
statistically straightforward, given the necessary data, while proving it
is almost impossible."253
247 See Harcourt supra note 123, at 1303.
248 See Barnes. supra note 29, at 210.
249 See id,
2" See id.
2" See id.
252 See id. This relative disparity between the information and power of government ac-
tors compared with alleged victims of profiling has led several scholars to propose a bur-
den-shifting approach. See id.; see also Smith, supra. note 44, at 247. For example, Professor
Michael Smith notes that police officers, law enforcement agencies, and the government
in general are better equipped to explain Particular officer and department practices than
a racial profiling complainant who must speculate as to the motives of these state actors.
See Smith, supra note 44, at 247. Police officers are accustomed to serving as witnesses and
justifying decisions in a courtroom. See id. In addition, the government has control of ac-
cess to information on traffic stop patterns and agency records, so it is in a much better
position to explain a particular officer's stop practices and state of mind than a racial pro-
filing complainant who must speculate as to true intent. See id. Smith contends that, be-
cause arguments regarding the state of mind of others are necessarily inferential in nature,
statistical evidence should raise enough of a presumption of intent to allow plaintiffs to
meet the prima facie burden of alleging discriminatory intent. See id. Given the above ad-
vantages government actors have, Smith believes that the burden of explaining apparent
disparities and producing such evidence should be placed on the government as the party
with superior access to information. See id.
255 See Lamber et al., supra note 18, at 584.
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Traditionally, civil rights claims have been crucial tools in bringing
about systematic reform because such unconstitutional practices can
affect a large class of people and draw substantial media attention. 254
To avoid large judgments and negative attention, law enforcement
agencies have been willing to negotiate settlements with changes in de-
partment practices and policies regarding vehicle stops and searches. 255
Civil litigation in particular is needed to address racial profiling be-
cause "even when the criminal case is disposed of favorably to the de-
fendant, if contraband can still be fairly attributed to him, juries are
unlikely to provide compensation, even for clear constitutional viola-
tions. "256
State and federal measures have not been sufficient to stop the
use of racial profiling by police departments. 257
 The practice of racial
profiling continues even after the majority of states have passed anti-
profiling legislation. 258
 In the post-September 11th world, the fervor
of protecting our nation from attack has shifted the focus away from
individual rights. 259
 The increased availability of civil relief from using
striking statistical disparities as sufficient prima facie evidence of in-
tent may help correct this imbalance. 26°
254 &c id.
"5
 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
255 See Rudovsky, supra note 114, at 354.
57 See id. For an interesting argument on why such measures cannot eradicate racial
profiling, see Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Con-
stitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 92-103 (1998) (arguing that - I[wpien there is prejudice
toward a discrete and insular minority, the legislature is likely to ignore or undervalue the
interests of that minority, and the resulting legislation may not reflect an accurate aggrega-
tion of everyone's individual interest?).
252 See Weatherspoon, supra note 5, at 738 (noting that the vast majority of racial profil-
ing legislation has been directed exclusively at state police). Professor Floyd Weatherspoon
advocates more inclusive legislation, broad enough to cover local officers in addition to
highway patrol. Id. Although the pervasiveness of racial profiling affects all levels of police
enforcement, only a few states have racial profiling legislation that covers all police offi-
cers, as contrasted with state troopers. See id. at 738 n.98. Connecticut and Oklahoma are
examples of two states that take such additional measures. Id. All proposed federal legisla-
tion to specifically target racial profiling in traffic stops and searches has been defeated,
with the last real attempts launched prior to September 11, 2001. See Leone, supra note 86,
at 335-36. Although the Civil Division of the Justice Department does have the power to
bring claims against law enforcement organizations, its efforts have been limited in recent
years. See Weatherspoon, supra note 5, at 734.
259 See Weatherspoon, supra note 5, at 738.
50 See id.
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CONCLUSION
Given the recent proliferation of databases and the development
of sound statistical methodologies to detect racial profiling, courts
should reconsider their stance on the use of statistical evidence to
prove discriminatory intent. Strong statistical associations between
drivers' race and frequency of stops/searches from well-planned sta-
tistical studies support an inference of discriminatory intent.
Many of the flaws of past studies that unsuccessfully attempted to
use statistical data to prove discriminatory intent have been corrected.
Some courts have already recognized the increased power of statistics
to demonstrate discriminatory intent. The approaches taken by courts
that allow the use of statistics to demonstrate intent have paved the
way for other jurisdictions to accurately assess the merits of the emerg-
ing body of statistical research on racial profiling. The courts can al-
low more civil rights claims of racial profiling to proceed to trial by
recognizing the increased quality and quantity of data available on
racial profiling to infer discriminatory intent.
In addition, the current political climate and the continued preva-
lence of racial profiling despite media attention to the dilemma suggest
that independent equal protection actions are needed to correct con-
tinued abuses. Courts have an increased responsibility to allow minori-
ties viable avenues to seek redress for grievances in eras such as the War
on Terror where the majority is less attentive to the wrongs of racial
profiling.
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